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DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES IN MARYLAND
In re Diener and Broccolinol
In re Foster'
INTRODUCTION

Judges are human. They are subject to physical, psychological, and moral pressures which may be imposed on any person in
an authoritative position of great responsibility. Occasionally a
member of the bench becomes incapable of performing his duties
or is found unworthy of the public trust vested in his position.
Various state procedures exist to mete out judicial discipline,
ranging from the traditional impeachment,3 through direct judicial supervision of its own members,4 to the latest innovation, a
commission' with a range of alternative sanctions' which are subject to judicial review.7
In line with the awareness that old procedures were inadequate, Maryland established a Commission on Judicial Disabilities by constitutional amendment in 1966. s Since then, the Com1. 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 567 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
2. 271 Md. 449, 318 A.2d 523 (1974).
3. Impeachment, the oldest disciplinary method, is an awkward procedure. It has
fallen into disuse as new and more efficient methods have supplemented its time consuming process and absolute result. From 1955 to 1970 only five states used the impeachment
remedy for judicial unfitness. W. Braithwaite, JudicialMisconduct and How Four States
Deal With It, 35 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROS. 151, 154 (1970).
4. E.g., the New Jersey Supreme Court construed its administrative power to discipline members of the bar to extend to lawyers in judicial office. In re Mattera, 34 N.J.
259, 168 A.2d 38 (1961). This procedure is now formalized in N.J.S.A. § 2A: 1B-1 to 11
(Supp. 1970), as authorized by N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, par. 4. New York has a Court on
the Judiciary composed of specified judges who hear cases after written requests by certain
authorities or on the motion of the chief judge of the court of appeals. See N.Y. CONST.
art. VI, § 22.
5. The commission method of judicial discipline originated in California in 1960. See
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18 and CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68701-04 (Supp. 1966). By 1973 at least
33 states had adopted this plan, usually as a supplement to their existing disciplinary
procedures. See generally, Braithwaite, note 3 supra, at 155 and AMERICAN JUDICATURaE
SOCIErY, JUDICIL DISABMITr AND REMOVAL COMMISSION, COURTS AND PROCEDURES (1973)
[hereinafter cited as AJS]. A similar plan is being considered for federal judges. See S.
4153, 93rd Cong., 2d Session, § (1974); N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1975, § 4, at 5, col. 2.
6. Judicial misconduct may range from bribery and other felonies to tardiness and
discourtesy. Thus, there should be a variety of remedies available, from informal admonition to formal public censure and termination of service, hopefully at a minimum of cost
and public spectacle. See Braithwaite, note 3 supra, at 167-68.
7. In a few states, however, the commission recommends discipline to the state
legislature. See AJS, note 5 supra, at 1-379.
8. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4A and 4B (1966). In the 1867 Constitution there were three
methods of judicial removal specified: removal by the governor (upon a judge's conviction
in a "Court of Law" for incompetency, wilful neglect of duty, misbehavior in office, or
any other crime); "address" by 2/3 vote of the general assembly (both authorized in MD.
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mission has made two disciplinary recommendations to the Court
of Appeals. In the first case, In re Diener and Broccolino,l each
judge had been given numerous parking tickets in the course of
his docket of the day (or immediately thereafter), and had been
asked by the presenting party (known not to be the person actually ticketed) for "a little consideration" or "to see what he
-[could] do for him." The Commission found that the two judges
disposed of these parking tickets "for reasons that can only be
described as friendship, or political favoritism, or the importuning of court clerks," and that this constituted "conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice," meriting censure.' 0
By a four to three vote, the Court of Appeals disregarded the
Commission's recommendation of censure," determined that
there were no mitigating circumstances which justified mere censure, and, seeing no alternative, ordered the removal of the
judges.' 2
In the second case, In re Foster," the Chief Judge of the
Supreme Bench of Baltimore City had engaged extensively in
land acquisition and development activities from late 1969 until
1972."1 Judge Foster had requested the mayor of Westminster,
CONST. art. IV, § 4); and impeachment (authorized in MD. CONST. art. Im, § 26). These
have been described as "tedious, cumbersome, expansive, long drawn-out and saturated
with political partisanship." Address by William J. O'Donnell, Chairman, Commission
on Judicial Disabilities, to Maryland Judicial Nominating Commissioners' Institute, May
25, 1973 (text on file at Office of the Dean, Univ. of Maryland School of Law) [hereinafter
cited as Address]. Although the Commission procedure is alternative to and cumulative
with art. IV, §§ 3 and 4 and art. III, § 26, (MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4B(c)), resort to these
alternative forms is highly unlikely, considering the Commission's power under the constitution, statute and court rule, and its comparative efficiency. However, a recent constitutional amendment may provide for automatic suspension and removal of a judge, regardless of Commission action. See note 40 infra.
For a history of the Commission concept as it developed in Maryland, see Justice
Smith's dissenting opinion in Dienerand Broccolino, 268 Md. at 699-723, 304 A.2d at 60820.
9. 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
10. Id.at 669, 304 A.2d at 593. The complete findings of fact of the Commission are
appendixed to the opinion. See 268 Md. at 689-97, 304 A.2d at 603-07.
11. The mitigating factors included the "endemic" conditions in the particular court
system where the judges sat, and that neither judge derived any financial benefit from
his actions and other judges at the time were engaging in similar conduct. 268 Md. at 670,
304 A.2d at 594.
12. Id.at 671, 304 A.2d at 594.
13. 271 Md. 449, 318 A.2d 523 (1974).
14. After negotiations with the seller in 1969, Judge Foster had obtained an option
for property in Carroll County by February 1970. He asked the mayor of Westminster to
introduce him to the Planning and Zoning Commission, which resulted in such a meeting,
and an impression that he would personally develop the property. He personally attended
three meetings with the various municipal officials, who were aware of his judicial positidn, to discuss proposed developments including utilities and rezoning problems.
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Maryland, to introduce him to the Planning and Zoning Commission, which resulted in a meeting and in an impression that he
would personally develop the property. He personally attended at
least three meetings to discuss the proposed development, including its utilities and zoning. After entering into an agreement with
Monumental Properties, a land development corporation, he introduced a Monumental official to the Planning and Zoning Commission, thus giving the appearance of acting as an agent for and
a joint adventurer with Monumental. 5 On these facts the Commission on Judicial Disabilities found "reasonable suspicion"'
that Judge Foster had utilized his office to persuade others to
contribute to the success of private business ventures. The Court
of Appeals agreed with the Commission that the judge's conduct
warranted censure," and rejected, inter alia, the judge's arguments that Canon XXIV could not apply to him retroactively,
and that "reasonable suspicion" was unconstitutionally vague as
an indicator of improper judicial conduct. 8
This comment will analyze, through the medium of the
Throughout this period he engaged in extensive correspondence concerning the project,
including letters to the city officials, all of which were typed by his official secretary during
regular work hours. He also had several meetings with city officials in his court chambers.
On Dec. 6, 1971, oudge Foster entered into two agreements with Monumental Properties, Inc. One of these provided that he was to pay Monumental $31,800 in exchange for
which Monumental would convey twelve acres of the subject property upon final authorization to it to build a number of dwelling units. Judge Foster presented a vice-president
of Monumental to the Planning and Zoning Commission, and from that time forward gave
the appearance of acting as the "agent" for Monumental, or as a joint adventurer with it
in the project. He wrote to the mayor requesting approval of Monumental's conditions,
and as a result on March 28, 1972, the city reduced sewer hookup charges for utilities by
$200 per unit. On March 23, 1972, the city passed an ordinance reducing the minimum
width and lot area for interior townhouses. The mayor stated that this was done at Judge
Foster's request. The fulfillment of these plus other conditions, enabling Monumental to
proceed to a settlement, was described by Judge Foster as a "remarkable feat."
At the settlement on April 28, 1972, Monumental's contract with Judge Foster was
modified, to place the deeded twelve acres into escrow until Monumental's development
plan was finally approved. The owner of the land, the McLanahan Trust, also benefitted
in this transaction, selling at $2650 per acre land previously valued at $1600 per acre.
Judge Foster had promised ten acres to the city, and actually deeded one, to
"sweeten" the development proposals. Judge Foster and Mrs. Foster on Dec. 11, 1973, held
title to eleven acres, valued presently at $132,000, but with a potential commercial value
of $360,000. The acreage might be used for commercial purposes. (Findings of Fact 1-20,
Commission on Judicial Disabilities, Report, Dec. 11, 1973).
15. 271 Md. at 460-62; 478, 318 A.2d at 529-30, 538.
16. See MD. CANONS OF JUDIcIAL ETHics XXIV, note 92 and accompanying text infra.
17. 271 Md. at 449, 318 A.2d at 528 (1974). The Commission only recommended
censure, not removal, since there was no official judicial misconduct, because of the "very
nature of the provision of Canon XXIV and Rule [9]," and in light of all the circumstances. Recommendation, Commission on Judicial Disabilities, Dec. 11, 1973.
18. 271 Md. at 470-78, 318 A.2d at 534-38.
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Diener and Broccolino and Foster decisions, the procedural and
substantive aspects of judicial discipline in Maryland. Before
examining the substantive problems in this area, it is advisable
to be acquainted with the nature and process of the Commission
of Judicial Disabilities and the review of its decisions by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISABILITIES

The Commission was created by constitutional amendment
in 1966 in response to a perceived need to expedite matters of
judicial discipline.' 9 Either upon receipt of a verified statement 0
or independently on its own motion, the Commission must make2
a preliminary investigation," providing the judge with notice1
and an opportunity to be heard. 3 If a majority of the commissioners decide "sufficient cause" is present to warrant a formal hearing, notice of hearing is given and within fifteen days the judge
may file an answer.2 4 At the recorded hearing,2 5 the judge has the
right to introduce and compel production of evidence, be repre19. The Commission consists of seven members appointed by the governor. Under
the present provision there are four members of the judiciary, two experienced members
from the active bar, and one "member of the public." Each has a four year term. MD.
CONST. art. IV, § 4A.
20. The complaint (which may be from any person) must not be obviously unfounded or frivolous and must allege facts sufficient to discipline the judge under Article
IV, § 4B(b) of the Maryland Constitution. See MD.R.P. 1227 f 1. Some complaints are
clearly frivolous, such as a complaint against the entire Court of Appeals which was based
on a lawyer's contention that the court had "improperly decided a case." Address, note 8
supra, at 6. In 1972 and 1973 the Commission opened a total of fifty-two files. Most of
these formal complaints were dismissed after a minimum investigation. There were
twenty-three preliminary investigations, but only two ripened into formal hearings.
COMMISSION ON JuDIcuL. DIsALrmI~s, REPORT FOR

1972

AND

1973 (mimeo).

21. See MD.CONST. art. IV § 4B (1973) and MD. R.P. 1227 f 1-4.
22. This includes disclosing both the nature of the complaint and the identity of the
complainant. MD. R.P. 1227 f 3. Revealing a complainant's identity (at the preliminary
investigation stage) has been criticized because of possible retaliation by the judge or his
colleagues. See Note, Remedies for Judicial Misconduct and Disability: Removal and
Discipline of Judges, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 149 (1966). However, the majority of commission
states do require identification of the complainant at the preliminary stage. See AJS, note
5 supra, at 1-319.
23. MD. R.P. 1227 f3.
24. MD. R.P. 1227 g 1 (b).
25. MD. R.P. 1227 i 3. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4B (1966). By statute, any members
of the Commission (or member of the general assembly) can administer oaths and affirmations and issue subpoenas. The statute also specifies the types of tangible evidence which
can be required to be produced. The circuit court is given jurisdiction to enforce subpoenas
using its contempt powers. MD.ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 13-401, 402 (1974).
And the statute reaffirms the Commission's authority under the Constitution to grant
witnesses immunity from prosecution. Compare MD.CONST. art. IV, § 4B(a) (1970) with
MD.ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 13-403 (1974).
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sented by counsel, and examine and cross-examine witnesses.2 1 If,
after a hearing, a majority of the eligible commissioners finds
"good cause", the Commission may issue a reprimand,2 7 or recommend censure, removal, "other appropriate discipline," or re28
tirement to the Court of Appeals.
Formerly all proceedings before the Commission were confidential and privileged, except that a record filed with the Court
of Appeals lost its confidential character. As authorized by a 1974
constitutional amendment 29 the Court of Appeals has recently
drafted rules allowing the release of information concerning Commission investigations, and permitting the sealing of part or all
of a proceeding filed with the court. 30
26. MD. R.R. 1227 j 1.
27. Ch. 886, § 1 [1974] Md. Laws 2961-62, amending MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4B
(1970). It is presently unclear whether such reprimands would be public or private. The
latter is more likely, since there is no significant difference between the former and censure.
Presumably, reprimands will be issued for such minor infractions as lateness in opening court, and caustic comments from the bench. The drafters of the provision felt only
repeated instances of this type of conduct could form the basis of a Commission recommendation of discipline to the Court of Appeals. MARYLAND COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL REFORM, INTERIM REPORT, 26-28 (Feb. 20, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Interim Report]. The
Commission would still be free to recommend a reprimand by the court, in a proper case.
It is not clear whether the judge could obtain judicial review of a Commission reprimand
which was not fowarded to the Court of Appeals as a recommendation. See notes 31-38
and accompanying text infra.
28. Ch. 886, § 1 [1974] Md. Laws 2961-62.
29. The Maryland Constitution is amended by three-fifths passage of the provision
in each house of the General Assembly and subsequent ratification of the provision by the
electorate in the next general election. MD. CONST. art. XIV, § 1.
30. See Ch. 886, § 1 [1974] Md. Laws 2961-62. Maryland used to be among the
majority of states which required commission proceedings to be confidential until the
filing for disciplinary action in the highest court of the state. See MD. R.P. 1227 e. In some
other states public disclosure is immediate, or made at the judge's request. See AJS, note
5 supra, at 1-379.
On March 10, 1975, the Court of Appeals adopted Rule 1227 r, which provides for
the confidentiality of Commission papers, proceedings, and evidence unless the Court of
Appeals directs, after formal request, the release of specific information to a legislative
committee, appointing authority, court or bar admission authority, or judicial selection
commission, which is considering an investigated judge. In addition, the Commission may
issue short clarifying statements if (a) pending charges result in "substantial unfairness"
to the judge who has requested such a clarifying statement, or (b) after Commission
investigation is concluded without further proceedings or disciplinary recommendation,
or (c) where broad public interest exists in the investigation, and confidence in the administration of justice is threatened due to lack of information concerning the status of the
proceeding and the requirements of due process. MD. R.P. 1227 r 2, 3. See Interim Report,
note 27 supra, at 28.
The new Rule also provides for the possible sealing of all or part of a Commission
record filed with the Court of Appeals. See MD. R.P. 1227 r 1. This reflects the claim of
the Commission on Judicial Reform that full disclosure of Commission proceedings often
resulted in "unsupported charges of improprieties being made public without affording
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Judicial Review
The Maryland Constitution as amended in 1974 states that,
"[u]pon any recommendation of the Commission, the Court of
Appeals . . . may remove . . . censure or otherwise discipline
. . . or. . . may retire the judge."' 31 Thus, any recommendation

of the Commission is subject to judicial review and modification.
Problems may arise, however, where the Commission does
not make any recommendation to the Court of Appeals, as where
a reprimand is issued directly by the Commission. No one would
doubt that a reprimand, if it becomes public, damages a judge's
reputation in the eyes of the general populace and the members
of the bench and bar. Fairness to the judge demands some
method of review of any Commission action. However, the Constitution only denotes Court of Appeals review of a Commission
recommendation. The Commission could solve this problem by
recommending all reprimands to the Court of Appeals, or the
Court of Appeals might promulgate a rule which would mandate
a Commission recommendation to the Court of Appeals upon
32
request of the judge.

In the absence of a subsequent Commission recommendation, there might be other avenues to appellate review, such as
mandamus.3 3 This would permit the review of the Commission
those charged the opportunity of a hearing." Interim Report, note 27 supra, at 28. However, before Court of Appeals review, there has already been a full Commission hearing,
confidential if necessary. There would seem to be less reason for confidentiality after an
opportunity for both sides to present evidence in a Commission hearing. Thus, there

should be full public disclosure of any matter before the Court of Appeals.
31. Ch. 886, § 1 [1974] Md. Laws 2961-62. The reviewing powers of the Court of
Appeals are broader since the 1974 constitutional amendment. Compare ch. 886, § 1
[19741 Md. Laws 2961-62 with MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4B (1973).
32. Such a rule could be promulgated under the amended Constitution, since it
allows the Commission to recommend any "appropriate discipline", and "any recommendation" is reviewable by the Court of Appeals. See Ch. 886, § 1 [1974] Md. Laws 296162. The court rule might also allow review of a private reprimand. See note 27 supra.
33. The common law writ of mandamus, directing the performance or nonperformance of particular public ministerial duties, has been used in Maryland to include
review of discretionary administrative actions. Baker v. Board of Trustees, 269 Md. 740,
744, 309 A.2d 768, 770 (1973); State Dep't of Health v. Walker, 238 Md. 512, 523, 209 A.2d
555, 561 (1965); Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 379, 45 A.2d 73, 76 (1945). However, the
Court of Appeals itself will not entertain any original petitions for writs such as mandamus. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Attorney Gen., 246 Md. 417, 427, 229 A.2d 388,
393 (1967); Henson v. State, 227 Md. 659, 660, 180 A.2d 300, 301 (1962); Moore v. Board
of License Comm'rs, 203 Md. 502, 505, 102 A.2d 272, 273-74 (1954); State ex rel. Mayor
and City Council v. Rutherford, 145 Md. 363, 368-70, 125 A. 725, 727-28 (1922). An
exception would have to be created for Commission review. This would be perfectly appropriate, since a recommendation is the only action directly appealable to the Court of
Appeals.
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reprimand, but might not permit the Court of Appeals to raise
the reprimand to an order of removal. Article 33 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights 34 provides: "That the independence and
uprightness of Judges are essential to the impartial administration of Justice, and a great security to the rights and liberties of
the People: Wherefore, the Judges shall not be removed, except
in the manner, and for the causes provided in this
Constitution. . . ."I' Article IV, Section 4B(b) does not expressly
permit the Court of Appeals to order removal except after a Commission recommendation of some form of discipline. Nevertheless, in Diener and Broccolino, the Court of Appeals ordered the
removal of two judges after the Commission had only recommended censure, an action that the Constitution did not explicitly permit at that time." The court simply held that the Commission's express power to recommend removal included the
lesser power to recommend censure, and thus Article 33 was no
impediment. 37 This holding of Diener and Broccolino provides the
court with precedent to raise any action by the Commission, including non-recommended reprimand, to removal.3 8
34. Prefacing the Maryland Constitution, the Declaration of Rights and the Constitution together compose the Maryland governmental charter, and they must be interpreted as one instrument. See Mayor and City Council v. State ex rel. Bd. of Police, 15
Md. 376 (1860). Article 33 contains concrete rules as to the removal of judges, and has
substantially the same force as any other part of the Maryland Constitution. E. NInEs,
MARYLAND CONSTITUIONAL LAw 14 (1915).
35. MD. CONST., Decl. of Rights, Art. 33 (emphasis added). The current phraseology
is unchanged since the present Constitution's adoption in 1867. See CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION, CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION STUDY DocuMENS 614-17 (1968). See
Gordy v. Dennis, 176 Md. 106, 114, 5 A.2d 69, 72 (1939). There is no similar provision in
any other state constitution.
36. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4B(b) (1970).
37. 268 Md. at 689, 304 A.2d at 603. However, the court's interpretation of the then
art. IV, § 4B(b) was questionable, since censure and removal were separately mentioned:
"Upon recommendation ... that a judge be removed from office, or. . . be retired, the
Court of Appeals . . . may remove the judge from office or may censure him ..
" Since
at that time there was no constitutional provision which expressly authorized a removal
order after a Commission recommendation of censure, any power the court may have
exercised to escalate the Commission's recommendations immediately violated Article 33.
38. However, Diener and Broccolino might be distinguished from the present problem. There the court held the greater power of recommendation included the lesser. Here,
in order to remove the judge in the absence of a Commission recommendation, the court
would have to find an implied power to review. This implied review power would violate
Article 33 if it led to removal.
There is no other possible justification of removal in the absence of a Commission
recommendation. Since the inhabitants of the State of Maryland are entitled to the
common law of England by Article 5 of the Md. Declaration of Rights, perhaps the English
mode of removal might be applicable. But as the dissent in Diener and Broccolino
indicated (268 Md. at 715, 304 A.2d at 619) the English courts did not regulate the conduct
of judicial officers after the Act of Settlement in 1701. See 12 and 13 Will. III c. 2. Thus
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Since the Maryland Constitution was amended in 1974, it is
clear that the Commission has the power to recommend any appropriate disciplinary action to the Court of Appeals, and the
court may accept or reject the recommendation. The remainder
of this comment will examine the substantive law of judicial discipline to determine when and what type of discipline is appropriate in various circumstances.
"CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE PROPER ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE": JUSTIFICATION OF DISCIPLINE

Formal ethical standards are necessary adjuncts to any judicial disciplinary system. They aid the judge in appraising his
future conduct, provide rules which can be enforced through the
discipline and review procedures, and reach conduct which, while
not inherently improper, should be restricted so as to prevent the
possibility or appearance of misconduct."
The Maryland Constitution provides for judicial discipline in
cases where the Court of Appeals, after proper review, finds misconduct while in office, persistent failure to perform duties of the
office, or conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.4 0 Official interpretations of these general phrases are contained in the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Rules of Judicial
Ethics. These have been adopted by the Maryland Court of Apthere was no common law practice of the judiciary disciplining its own when Maryland's
first constitution was ratified in 1776. See M. Zizkind, Judicial Tenure in the American
Constitution:English and American Precedents, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 135, 137 (1969). Even
if there had been such a practice, it is clear that Art. 33 of the Declaration of Rights
abolished it. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
39. See generally Martineau, The Authority of a State Supreme Court to Regulate
Judicial Ethics, 15 ST. L.L.J. 203 (1971).
40. Ch. 886, § 1 [1974] Md. Laws 2961-62, amending MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4B(b)
(1973). See also MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (Governor may remove upon a judge's conviction
for incompetency, wilful neglect of duty, misbehavior in office, or any other crime) and
note 8 supra.
In addition to the above provision, a 1974 constitutional amendment has apparently
rendered judges liable to automatic suspension without pay or benefits upon conviction
or a plea of nolo contendere to any felony, or to a misdemeanor "related to his public
duties and responsibilities and [which] involves moral turpitude for which the penalty
may be incarceration." If the conviction becomes final, removal is automatic. Ch. 879, § 1
[1974] Md. Laws 2942-45, now MD. CONST. art. XV, § 3. The provision applies to "any
elected official of the State.

.

. county or.

.

. municipal corporation." Id. Although both

appellate and trial judges in Maryland are now appointed, each judge must be elected at
the next general election, and every fifteen years thereafter. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 5.
Therefore, once the judge has been elected, he should be subject to the amendment.
However, it is not clear whether a newly-appointed judge who has not yet been elected
would also be subject to automatic suspension and removal.
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peals and are binding on Maryland judges as part of the Maryland Rules."
1.

Canons

The first organized list of standards was the Canons of Judicial Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1924.42
The Canons were intended to be nothing more than guides for
individual judges,43 but by 1968 they had been adopted either as
advisory or as binding by a majority of state supreme courts." In
1972 the A.B.A. adopted a new Code of Judicial Conduct, revising
the organization, language, and to some degree the substance of
the Canons.45
The Maryland State Bar Association formally adopted the
original Canons of Judicial Ethics in 1953.46 From that time until
the creation of the Commission on Judicial Disabilities in 1966,
however, they were mere recommendations, neither adopted by
the courts nor with any enforceable procedures except through
impeachment. 7 Although the Commission made no formal rec41. See MD.R.P. 1231. Although misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform
the duties to the office, or a disability seriously interfering with the performance of duties
which is, or is likely to become, permanent are other stated grounds for a preliminary
investigation which may eventually result in a commission recommendation (see MD. R.P.
1227 f 1), Rule 1231's effect may be to include these grounds within "conduct prejudicial
to the proper administration of justice." Included within Rule 1231 are the Rules of
Judicial Ethics, which contain particular requirements and prohibitions. See note 52 and
accompanying text infra. Ethics Rule 14 makes any Ethics Rule violation "conduct
prejudicial to the proper administration of justice." Since Ethics Rule 1 equates an Ethics
Rule violation with an aggravated or persistent failure to comply with the Canons, and
since all three of the above grounds would satisfy Rule l's equation, all three of the
grounds thereby amount to "conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice."
The two cases which reached the Court of Appeals each used the phrase, even though
the two judges in the first case also arguably engaged in misconduct while in office. To
the extent future Commission and Court of Appeals disciplinary actions are grounded in
the current Rule 1231 and especially on the interplay between Ethics Rules 1 and 14,
reliance on the three remaining "good causes" above (except disability) will lessen.
42. 49 ABA REP. 65-71 (1924).
43. Martineau, Enforcement of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 1972 UTAH L. REv.
410, 411.

44. See AMERICAN

JUDICATURE SocIEry, CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS

4-11 (Report Nov.

8, 1968). Statutes, constitutions, and various bar associations have also adopted the Canons. See Martineau, note 43 supra, at 411.
45. See Symposium on the Code of Judicial Conduct, 1972 UTAH L. REv: 333-464.
The new Code is reproduced id. at 337-51. In 1974 the Maryland Court of Appeals incorporated parts of the Code into the existing Canons. See note 109 infra.
46. See 58 TRANSACTIONS, MD. ST. BAR Assoc. 252 (1953). Since the Maryland State
Bar Association is not formally connected with the courts, its adoption of the Canons did
not bind any judges under force of law. However, the association's adoption was and is
evidence of what the bar feels is proper judicial conduct.
47. See note 3 supra. The Maryland State Bar Association's Ethics Committee has
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ommendations from 1966 to 1970 it probably could have used the
Canons as part of the criteria for ascertaining "conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice."4 Finally, in 1970, the
Maryland Judicial Conference4 9 adopted the Maryland Canons
by resolution." More specific disciplinary rules were not promulgated until 1971, when the entire set of Canons were set forth in
Rule 1231. In summary, then, Maryland judges have been aware
of the A.B.A. Canons since 1924, but only since 1971 have the
Canons and new disciplinary rules of judicial ethics been formally
imposed as enforceable rules governing judges' conduct.
2.

Rules of JudicialEthics

An examination of the present Rule 1231 reveals that the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, composing the first part of that rule,
consist of simple advisory axioms of judicial common sense. On
the other hand, the Rules of Judicial Ethics," the second part of
Rule 1231, contain particular requirements and prohibitions,
using the mandatory word "shall" as opposed to the Canons'
more permissive "should." 5
used the 1953 Canons as the basis for answering submitted questions, but these have no
force of law behind them. See I Proceedings, Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the
Maryland Judicial Conference 29-30 (1969).
48. In re Foster, 271 Md. 449, 471, 318 A.2d 523, 534 (1974). This utilization of the
Canons would parallel the Court of Appeals' use of the pre-1969 Canons of Professional
Ethics (never formally adopted as a court rule) as a standard to measure the conduct of
lawyers. See, In re Lombard, 242 Md. 202, 207, 218 A.2d 208, 211 (1966). In 1970, after a
new Code of Professional Responsibility for attorneys was approved !:1xthe American Bar
Association, the Court of Appeals formally adopted it by Rule 1230.
49. The Maryland Judicial Conference, which meets and reports annually is authorized by Maryland Rule 1226
to consider the status of judicial business in the various courts, to devise means for
relieving congestion of dockets where it may be necessary, to consider improvements of practice and procedure in the courts, to consider and recommend legislation, and to exchange ideas with respect to the improvement of the administration
of justice and the judicial system of Maryland.
MD. R.P. 1226 a 1. It consists of the judges of the Court of Appeals, Court of Special
Appeals, Circuit Courts (including Supreme Bench of Baltimore City) and the District
Courts. MD. R.P. 1226 a 2.
50. The Canons relevant to this comment are identical to those adopted by the
Maryland State Bar Association.
51. MD. R.P. 1231, Md. Rules of Judicial Ethics [hereinafter cited as Md. Ethics
Rules].
52. There is confusion as to whether the Canons are suggestive or mandatory. These
semantic problems could be eliminated by the court's complete adoption of the new Code
of Judicial Conduct approved by the American Bar Association in 1972. See note 45 supra.
Cf. note 109 infra. Its adoption would be beneficial in providing a unified code which by
its terms is mandatory unless otherwise indicated. See Preface, ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL
CoNDucr. As of Oct. 31, 1974, thirty-five states had adopted all or part of the Code. As
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Unlike the Canons, the Ethics Rules also indicate the consequences of a violation. Ethics Rule 14 states "violations of any of
these rules is conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of
justice within the meaning of Maryland Rule 1227 (Removal or
Retirement of Judges)." 53 The Canons are incorporated into the
Rules of Judicial Ethics by Ethics Rule 1, which provides that
"an aggravated or persistent failure to comply with the Canons
of Judicial Ethics shall be deemed a rule violation." 5 Thus, the
Ethics Rules carry more disciplinary potential than the Canons.55
Ethics Rule 15 establishes a Judicial Ethics Committee,
which acts as an advisory panel to supplement the Commission
on Judicial Disabilities. The rule states that any judge may in
writing request the opinion of the Committee on any aspect of
Rule 1231, and compliance with the majority ruling affords complete protection of the requesting judge from any charge of violation .51
Although the Canons and Ethics Rules form a defined structure, they are certainly not the only sources for interpreting "conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice." For example, the Maryland court in Diener and Broccolino declined to
define the term outright and did not rely on the Canons. The
court determined that disposing of cases for reasons other than
an honest appraisal of the facts and law would always be "conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice." 5 This
case indicates clearly that the court will look to general norms of
the profession and will not be limited to the court rules in defining
improper judicial conduct.
In contrast to the court's ignoring the Canons in Diener and
Broccolino, one of the major issues in Foster was whether the
court could properly apply the Canons to Judge Foster's conduct
which bracketed the July 1971 adoption of the Canons as a formal
more states follow, a multitude of fact situations would lead to ethical opinions by the
judiciary, commissions, and bar associations (including the ABA). Thus a comprehensive,
and hopefully consistent, body of law would form and provide judges in Maryland and

elsewhere with further notice of their ethical responsibilities.
53. Md. Ethics Rule 14.
54. Md. Ethics Rule 1.
55. This is not to say that, absent a persistent or aggravated violation of the Canons,
no action by the Commission on Judicial Disabilities is possible. Any complaint to the
Commission will initiate an investigation, and in other states such an inquiry has usually
effected the desired change. See Frankel, Removal of Judges: California Tackles an Old
Problem, 49 A.B.A.J. 166, 170 (1963). If necessary, the Commission might also reprimand
the offending judge. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
56. Md. Ethics Rule 15.
57. 268 Md. at 670, 304 A.2d at 594.
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rule of court. 58 The majority provided alternative rationales for
applying the Canons: that norms of conduct existed in the profession (with the knowledge of Judge Foster in particular), and that
even if the Canons were not applied to his early conduct, there
was censurable conduct which occurred after July 1971.11
A majority of the court declared that since the 1966 adoption
of sections 4A and 4B of Article IV of the Maryland Constitution,
it has been possible to discipline a Maryland judge for "misconduct while in office" or "conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice," 0 for which objective standards could have
been found in the Canons of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar
Association, and the ethical opinions published thereunder.'
The constitutional language under which Judge Foster was
censured was adopted before Judge Foster's activities had begun.
Application of the Canons to pre-1971 conduct would be reasonable if the principles they embody could fairly have been used from
1966 to help define the constitutional language.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics were adopted by the Maryland State Bar Association in 1953.2 This indicates that, at least
as early as 1953, the Maryland legal community recognized conduct proscribed by the Canons to be detrimental to the reputation of the judiciary. 3 In the debates leading to the resolution by
58. MD. R.P. 1231. By the date of the Canon's adoption, July 1, 1971, Judge Foster,
through Wheeler Holding had acquired the option to purchase the tract, and had had
much personal contact with the local city officials. His association with Monumental
Properties began after this date. See note 14 supra.
59. 271 Md. at 478, 318 A.2d at 538. See notes 17, 18 and accompanying text supra.
60. See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 4B(b) (1973).
61. 271 Md. at 471-72, 318 A.2d at 534-35. The majority also noted that at the
threshold of his involvement, Judge Foster was Chairman of the Maryland Judicial Conference in 1970, the year the Judicial Conference adopted the ABA Canons in principal.
He was also an original member of the Commission on Judicial Disabilities, active in the
American Bar Association, and president of the National Conference of Trial Judges. That
Judge Foster was questioned concerning the ethics of his proposed transactions at the
threshold of the negotiations also should have dictated a more cautious approach. See 271
Md. at 470-73, 318 A.2d at 534-35.
The dissenting judges, in an opinion by Judge Smith, believed that censuring a judge
under Canon XXIV and an Ethics Rule not effective until July 1, 1971, was "repugnant
to traditional concepts of Anglo-American jurisprudence and elementary fairness," noting
Maryland's constitutional ban against ex post facto laws. 271 Md. at 480-81, 318 A.2d at
539. See MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 17. The dissent admitted that since 1966
a Maryland judge could be disciplined under the constitution, but only for acts traditionally regarded as improper, such as in Diener and Broccolino, and not for technical violations of the Canons. See 271 Md. at 481-82, 318 A.2d at 539-40.
62. See 58 TRANSACTIONS, MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 239-52 (1953). See note
46 supra.
63. Since 1924, the ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics were also recognized by the
national legal community as appropriate judicial guidelines. With minor amendments,
these were adopted as the Maryland Canons in 1971.
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the Maryland Judicial Conference, approving the principles of
the Canons in 1970, it was asserted that the Commission on Judicial Disabilities had Canon enforcement responsibility since 1966,
and stated that the Ethics Committee had been using the 1953
Canons to answer submitted ethical questions. 4 Judge Foster
himself recognized the potential force of the Canons when he said
at the 1970 meeting: "We ought to have sufficient judgment to
decide whether or not our activities are conflicting with our work
or with our responsibilities, and if we don't then under Canon 23
and 24 we certainly may be taken to task." 5 At that conference,
the judges formally determined to be bound by the Canons."6 This
was prior to the date on which Judge Foster first filed his petition
for rezoning the land in question.
There are cases in other states which used the Canons as
standards for judicial conduct, despite their lack of formal adoption within the particular jurisdiction. The Foster court referred
to In re Troy,67 where the Massachusetts court also pointed to the
formally unadopted Canon XXIV as a "generally accepted
guide." 6 In re DeSaulnier5 applied the proposal of Canon 5 of the
new ABA Code of Judicial Conduct70 (roughly corresponding to
Maryland Canon XXIV) to a Massachusetts judge's past conduct
and found that "[tihere can be little doubt that, measured by
the general standards of new Canon 5, which directly reflect longexisting and well recognized principles of judicialconduct, Judge
DeSaulnier's conduct as shown by our findings falls far short [of
Canon 5's standard]." 7 The California Supreme Court has similarly applied the new ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, stating
64. See II Proceedings, Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the Maryland Judicial
Conference, 17-18, 29-30 (1969) as cited in Memorandum for Commission on Judicial
Disabilities, In re Foster, 17-18. Cf. 271 Md. at 471 and 472, 318 A.2d at 534 and 535.
65. (Emphasis added). II Proceedings, Twenty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the Maryland Judicial Conference 36 (1970), as cited in Memorandum for Commission on Judicial
Disabilities, In re Foster, 19.
66. 271 Md. at 468 n.10, 318 A.2d at 533 n.10.
306 N.E.2d 203, 233-34 (1973).
67. 1973 Mass. A.S. __,
68. 271 Md. at 471-72, 318 A.2d at 534-35.
69. 1972 Mass. A.S. 65, 279 N.E.2d 296 (1972).
70. See note 52 supra and note 109 infra.
, 279 N.E.2d at 309 (emphasis added). See also In re
71. 1972 Mass. A.S. at 306 N.E.2d 203, 234 (1973) ("[tihese standards, old and
Troy, 1973 Mass. A.S. -,
new, are a simple reflection of what every judge should instinctively recognize as proper
conduct").
The Foster dissent argued Judge Troy's conduct was generally recognized as forbidden. See note 76 and accompanying text infra. Thus the Massachusetts court's reliance
on the Canons was discounted. See 271 Md. at 481-82, 318 A.2d at 539-40. However, this
argument attacks the application of a particular Canon, and does not reach the merits of
applying the entire set of Canons.
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"California is fortunate in that it need not formally adopt the
proposed code in order to hold its judiciary to the high standard
of conduct the public and the bar are entitled to expect of the
judicial branch of government."" These applications, even
broader than Maryland's, indicate that the original 1924 Canons
of Judicial Ethics and subsequent enactments have embodied a
tradition which offers adequate guidance for judges despite the
lack of formal adoption. While fairness to the judge might dictate
prior enactment of a totally new and unique provision before its
violation could be charged, here the Canons have been longstanding and well-known embodiments of common notions of
judicial ideals.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has, in Foster, accepted the
view of the majority of jurisdictions that have been presented
with the issue that judges can be disciplined for violating the
Canons of Judicial Ethics despite their lack of formal adoption.
This conclusion implies that the Canons are the embodiment of
previously accepted standards of judicial conduct. There may be
a difference, however, between violations of the Canons as in
Foster,and clear violations of a judge's duty not contained there,
as far as the severity of discipline is concerned.
3.

Conduct Meriting Judicial Discipline

"Conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice"
is a broad term, which in application yields varying results. In all
of the following situations the definition was satisfied and resulted in removal or its equivalent: (1) judge used vulgar language in the presence of and in reference to professional associates, employees and officers of the court, and interfered with the
attorney-client relation between public defenders and their
clients;13 (2) judge failed to order jury trials upon request, to
process and dispose of misdemeanor and felony cases promptly,
and to keep accurate records of his court's proceedings; 4 (3) pro72. Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal.3d 270, 282, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 201, 208, 515 P.2d 1, 8 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
73. Id. The same court had defined its standard for judicial conduct: "conduct
which constantly reaffirms fitness for the high responsibility of judicial office. It is immaterial that the conduct concerned was probably lawful, albeit unjudicial ....
" 10
Cal.3d at 281, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 208, 515 P.2d at 8. Judge Geiler was removed for the
combination of willful misconduct and "conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute." 10 Cal.3d at 284, 110 Cal. Rptr. at
209-10, 515 P.2d at 9-10. See CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 18.
74. In re Heideman, 387 Mich. 630, 198 N.W.2d 291 (1973) ("conduct ...
clearly
prejudicial to the administration of justice").
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bate judge commingled funds belonging to an estate with his
personal funds and negotiated a loan to himself from an estate
under his personal control and order; 5 (4) judge lied under oath,
pressured a lawyer for a political contribution, wilfully directed
filling of tidewater area in an illegal manner, consistently neglected judicial duties, consistently used court officer as bulldozer
operator during court hours, and procured substantial legal services from lawyers appearing before him without paying them and
without disclosing his relationship to opposing counsel;"6 (5) judge
convicted of federal crime of conspiring to use mail to perpetrate
fraud (conduct occurred before becoming a judge);" (6) judge
interfered with judicial investigation into matters pertaining to
his former law partnership; 8 (7) judge involved in procuring
woman for illicit acts and associated with persons with known
criminal records and reputations."
From these cases one can draft a general rule that conviction
of a felony, gross misconduct outside the courthouse, or incompetence in performing judicial duties will warrant removal.
Applying this rule to the Diener and Broccolino facts, disposing
of parking tickets for reasons other than an honest appraisal of
the facts and the law,80 illustrates the tremendous discretion in
applying any rule.' This is a case of improper motive of adjudication, involving neither the commission of a felony nor conduct
75. In re Graham, 366 Mich. 268, 114 N.W.2d 333 (1962) (suspension and recommendation of removal to legislature).
76. In re Troy, 1973 Mass. A.S. __,
306 N.E.2d 203 (1973) (disbarment and suspension of judicial powers).
77. In re Greenberg, 442 Pa. 411, 280 A.2d 370 (1971) (only suspension until conviction final). See also In re Pfingst, 44 App. Div. 2d 157, 354 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1973) (removal
after federal criminal conviction).
78. In re Friedman, 12 N.Y.2d (a-e) (Ct. on Jud. 1963), 19 App. Div. 2d 120, 241
N.Y.S.2d 793, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 10 (1963). See also In re Osterman, 12 N.Y.2d
(a-e) (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 914 (1964); Bartlett v. Enea, - App. Div. 2d -,
359 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1974).
79. In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So.2d 469 (1970).
80. 268 Md. at 671, 304 A.2d at 594.
81. The Commission had only recommended censure, because of the lack of financial gain, general reliance on clerks who curried favor, and acceptance of prior court
practices as precedent. However, the Maryland court discounted these considerations and
saw "no alternative" to the judges' removal, despite the permissive nature of the court's
mandate in Article IV, § 4B(b): "may censure" and "may be removed." Id. at 734, 304
A.2d at 625. Certainly the lenient recommendation should have provoked more factual
comparisons and analysis than the majority proffered.
Although in each case the judge had already resigned, two former New Jersey judges
who were involved in fixing one traffic ticket were suspended from the practice of law,
one for two months and the other for six months. See In re Spitalnick, 63 N.J. 429, 308
A.2d 1 (1973); In re Sgro, 63 N.J. 538, 310 A.2d 459 (1973). Their prior resignation plus
their isolated conduct move their cases away from the Dienerand Broccolino fact pattern.
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outside the courtroom. Disposition of a case for personal reasons
unrelated to the merits clearly involves a drastic misapprehension of the nature of a judge's function on the bench, thus fitting
within the third part of the rule, incompetence.
In order to determine if the Maryland court was harsher than
others, it is necessary to explore cases in other jurisdictions resulting in censure:82 (1) judge actively aided a party in a case before
him and "gave an impression approximately equivalent to that
of attorney representation," and gave the same impression in
dealings with a former client who had just escaped from the state
jail, and committed other infractions;ss (2) judge made remarks
during juvenile hearing indicating ethnic bias;8 ' (3) judge referred
to victim of alleged crimes in insulting manner in chambers and
in court;8 5 (4) while attired in judicial robes, judge negotiated in
chambers with counsel concerning disposition of charges against
his fellow law partner; 8 (5) judge consoled at length in his chambers a court employee whose son was arrested, and continued to
answer her telephone calls, in the last of which the judge agreed
to meet her for further discussion and possibly to have a drink;8 7
(6) judge was under the influence of alcohol on more than one
occasion during a two month period, and permitted a magistrate
to take a major role in arraigning criminal defendants;88 (7) judge
represented relatives appearing in traffic court;8 9 (8) judge
permitted bailiff to participate in sentencing, periodically and
suddenly assumed the role of advocate or witness, and was intemperate with court personnel (but mollified by inexperience and
striving for judicial reform).9 0 From these cases it may be gath82.

Censure, in ecclesiastical law, was a form of spiritual punishment. BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY 283 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). In this note it refers to the public upbraiding of a

judge, whether it is called either formal censure or public reprimand.
83. In re Robson, 500 P.2d 657 (Alas. 1972). The Alaskan court increased the Commission's recommendation of a private reprimand to formal censure. Id. at 660-61.
Judge Barnes, in his dissent in Dienerand Broccolino, concluded that the conduct of
the Maryland judges "[did] not begin to equal" the impropriety of the Alaskan judge's
actions. See 268 Md. at 671, 304 A.2d at 629.
84. In re Chargin, 2 Cal.3d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 709, 471 P.2d 29 (1970).
85. In re Glickfeld, 3 Cal.3d 891, 92 Cal. Rptr. 278, 479 P.2d 638 (1971).
86. In re Maidman, 42 App. Div. 2d 44, 345 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1973).
87. In re Suglia, 36 App. Div. 2d 326, 320 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1971) ("[conduct] unnecessarily and unwisely put a burden of explanation and justification not only on himself but
on the judiciary of which he is an officer").
88. In re Somers, 384 Mich. 320, 182 N.W.2d 314 (1971).
89. See Judicial Inquiry and Review Comm'n v. Jordan, No. 730725, Supreme Court
of Virginia, Oct. 8, 1973 (unreported order).
90. McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 12 Cal.3d 512, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 260, 526 P.2d 268 (1974). A few recent cases do not fit into the noted patterns because
of their unusual leniency. See In re Sanchez, 9 Cal.3d 844, 109 Cal. Rptr. 78, 512 P.2d
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ered that isolated lapses of personal or professional conduct and
lack of proper judicial temperament are the most frequent causes
of censure. However, no other censure case besides In re Foster"
has been found which relied solely on the "reasonable suspicion"
of utilizing his position for business persuasion purposes, which
is contained in ABA Canon XXV (Maryland Canon XXIV):
A judge should avoid giving ground for any reasonable suspicion that he is utilizing the power or prestige of his office to
persuade or coerce others to patronize or contribute, either
to the success of private business ventures, or to charitable
enterprises. He should, therefore, not enter into such private
business, or pursue such a course of conduct, as would justify
such suspicion, nor use the power of his office or the influence of his name to promote the business interests of others;
he should not solicit for charities, nor should he enter into
any business relation which, in the normal course of events
reasonably to be expected, might bring his personal interest
into conflict with the impartial performance of his official
duties .92
Judge Foster was also censured for violating Ethics Rule 8 (now
Rule 9), which forbids a judge to "directly or indirectly, lend the
influence of his name or the prestige of his office to aid or advance
the welfare of any private business or permit others to do so." '
The Commission on Judicial Disabilities believed that the
words "reasonable suspicion" should be given their normal mean302 (1973); In re Chavez, 9 Cal.3d 846, 109 Cal. Rptr. 79, 512 P.2d 303 (1973) (judges
regularly furnished bail bondsman signed, but otherwise blank, prisoner release orders;
the bondsman later filled in the orders, fixed bail and released arrestees without judicial
authority, and gave copies of the orders to the judges); In re Emmet, 300 So.2d 435 (Ala.
1974) (no censure where judge sent letters to appellate judges explaining and encouraging
affirmance of his high bonds for certain individuals). For a listing of judicial discipline
cases by type of misconduct, see Lowe, The Developing Law on Judicial Disability and
Removal, published in Materials From Fourth National Conference of Judicial Disabilities and Removal Commissions, Los Angeles, Calif., Oct. 25-26, 1973, 27-49. See generally
Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 882 (1973), and AJS, note 5 supra.
91. 271 Md. 449, 317 A.2d 523 (1974).
92. This Canon was identical with Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics of the
American Bar Association at the time of its adoption by the Court of Appeals on May 4,
1971. 271 Md. at 468, 318 A.2d at 533.
93. Md. Ethics Rule 9. Ethics Rule 14 states that a violation of any other Ethics
Rule is "conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice," and thus grounds
for disciplinary action.
The Commission distinguished the Diener and Broccolino result of removal by noting
that Judge Foster's extra-judicial conduct did not affect his official duties, whereas the
two aforementioned judges improperly disposed of cases pending in their courts. The
Foster court impliedly accepted this distinction. See 271 Md. at 478, 318 A.2d at 538.
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ing, "a belief or apprehension founded or based on reason."" The
Foster majority agreed: the phrase had a "long history" in Canon
XXV of the ABA Canons; the court simply listed, without comment, two definitions of "suspicion"9 5 and defined "reasonable"
in reference to the "reasonable and prudent man" test in negligence law:
Given a certain set of facts, would a reasonable person be
justified in suspecting that a judge might be "utilizing the
power or prestige of his office to persuade . . . others to...
contribute . . . to the success of private business ventures. .... ?1
The majority, cognizant that "reasonable suspicion" is "an elas94.
95.

evidence.

Memorandum of Commission on Judicial Disabilities, In re Foster, 1-2.
"[1Imagination or apprehension of something wrong or without proof, on slight
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

2542 (2nd ed. 1944); that state of

mind which in a reasonable man would lead to inquiry. . . . Stuart v. Farmers Bank, 137
Wisc. 66, 73, 117 N.W. 820, 822 (1908)." 271 Md. at 475-76, 318 A.2d at 537.
96. Id. at 476-77, 318 A.2d at 537. The Foster court rejected Judge Foster's argument that another person may have had the same degree of success as the judge. The court
held that the proper test is "whether a reasonable man would be justified in suspecting
that the result which Judge Foster achieved was achieved because of his position and
prestige." Id. at 469, 318 A.2d at 533. If the same results could not have been achieved by
someone else, that is relevant in determining whether "reasonable suspicion" exists, but
the converse does not establish that the conduct complained of was proper. A judge might
exert the most flagrant pressure to achieve his goals, yet be unsuccessful in gaining special
treatment. This lack of special treatment would not remove the improper conduct.
The Foster dissent did not believe the majority "came to grips" with a definition of
"reasonable suspicion", and could find no cases that did so. It suggested the civil "probable cause" standard used in malicious prosecution cases:
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing that the
accused is guilty . . . . Mere belief, however sincere, is not sufficient. There must
be such grounds of belief founded upon actual knowledge of facts as would influence
the mind of a reasonable person.
Id. at 482, 318 A.2d at 540. The dissent, by analogy to the criminal justice system, felt
any definition of "reasonable suspicion" other than the civil "probable cause", would raise
questions of vagueness. The dissent stated that a man's reputation and livelihood are at
stake, and that his interest in preventing the attachment of the stigma of censure is
significant. See id. at 485-94, 318 A.2d at 542-46. However, the Supreme Court of the
United States has applied the vagueness doctrine almost exclusively to criminal statutes.
See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). Cf. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
Judicial disciplinary proceedings are fundamentally different from criminal prosecutions.
A state can require a high official to account for his performance in that office. See, e.g.,
Napolitano v. Ward, 457 F.2d 279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1037 (1972) (judge's
removal by state using transactional immunity testimony was not like penal aspect of a
criminal proceeding). The impracticability of defining precisely all prohibited conduct
should not render the utilized standard unconstitutional. Judicial review is always available in the individual civil case to nullify a vague application of the standard. See Bence
v. Breier, 501 F.2d 1185, 1195 (7th Cir. 1974) (Jameson, J., concurring). "Reasonable
suspicion" of improper business dealing is not so vague as to override the public interest
in maintaining a judiciary free from any hints of undue influence.
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tic standard based on questions of degree,"9 7 held that when
Judge Foster personally and publicly assumed a command responsibility in the furtherance of the real estate project, which
conduct persisted over a two year period and involved personal
appearances, continuing correspondence, and frequent telephone
calls, he created an atmosphere where ground was given for "reasonable suspicion" of using his position for economic advantage. 8
There is other authority to the effect that conduct which
gives the appearance of using a judicial position to aid private
business dealings is improper within the meaning of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics. In CincinnatiBar Association v. Heitzler," an
Ohio judge, inter alia, was a director of a loan company, and
entered numerous judgments on its behalf. 00 As a consequence he
was suspended from the practice of law indefinitely. In deciding
that the judge's dealings raised a "reasonable suspicion" of exploitation of his position, the Ohio court stated
[i]f the fact of a judge's membership on the board of directors is used by the corporation to persuade others to patron97. 271 Md. at 475, 318 A.2d at 536. Counsel for the Commission advanced at oral
argument a smoke-fire analogy which helps explain the application of the phrase:
[The test is] whether the reasonable man would believe that, not that he would
necessarily conclude that the impropriety had occurred, but that there was smoke
and hence there may very well be fire and when the smoke is caused by the judge's
putting himself into that position, the canon prohibits that and admonishes judges
not to, I believe, get into a situation where by their activities they create the smoke
whether or not there is fire.
Id. at 500, 318 A.2d at 549.
98. Id. at 475, 318 A.2d at 536. The Foster majority recognized that if Wheeler
Holding Co., through an attorney, had continued the land development process and investigative reporting had identified Judge Foster as a stockholder, there would not be grounds
for "reasonable suspicion." Id. It was Judge Foster's personalinvolvement with the city
officials which gave rise to the reasonable suspicion regardless of any publicity. Awareness
of this personal involvement by anyone would warrant a commission investigation. Even
in the holding company situation a judge would probably have a duty to prevent his agents
from using the prestige of his office. See notes 99-101 and accompanying text infra.
The dissent criticized disciplining a judge for actions which did not involve moral
turpitude or affect professional performance. The minority judges felt the imposition of
discipline in these cases would tend to be influenced by the degree to which the offense
became known to the public: "Without the hue and cry of certain elements of the media
against Judge Foster no reasonable suspicion of his misconduct would have been perceived
by anyone anywhere." Id. at 502-03, 318 A.2d at 550-51. However, this argument ignores
the possibility of one person who had attended the zoning board meeting making a formal
complaint, thus triggering the disciplinary process regardless of any further publicity.
99. 32 Ohio St. 2d 214, 291 N.E. 2d 477 (1972). Cf. In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 30911 (Alas. 1975).
100. The judge was also faulted for giving the impression of living with a woman
while separated from his wife, and for hiring a man with a lengthy criminal record as a
constable. Id. at -,
291 N.E.2d at 482-88.
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ize it or is used by the corporation to promote its business
interest, the judge, by accepting membership on the board
of directors, has given ground for "reasonable suspicion"
that the judge is using "the power or prestige of his office"
for that purpose."' °
The use of "reasonable suspicion" in this context indicated the
court's willingness to apply the phrases so that the first act of the
judge (accepting the membership post) may later be found to
have given grounds for "reasonable suspicion" if the fact of the
membership was subsequently misused by others. The court
found that when the judge accepted membership on that board,
he undertook the affirmative duty to make certain that there
would be no misuse by the company of that membership.'02
An opinion of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the
American Bar Association illustrated the dangers inherent in
such business relationships. Formal Opinion 254103 decided that
it was improper for a trial judge to serve as a director of a bank.
In reference to Canon 25 (Maryland's Canon XXIV), the Committee said:
A certain amount of publicity is given by all banks to the
personnel of their board of directors. Accordingly, publicity
would be given to the fact that the bank had a judge on its
board. This might create reasonablesuspicion that the judge
was utilizing the prestige of his office to persuade others to
1
partonize the bank. The Canon condemns such conduct. 04
This opinion and Heitzler indicate that foreseeable future publicity tending to discredit the judiciary is clearly an element of
"reasonable suspicion." Heitzler was an instance where the initial
act of the judge gave "reasonable suspicion" of impropriety because it was foreseeable that his position would be used by others
to gain special treatment. Judge Foster's appearance before a
101. Id. at __, 291 N.E.2d at 485 (emphasis added).
102. Id.
103. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 254 (1943). See also
Opinion 322 (1969) (judge must order his personal affairs to avoid appearance of impropriety) and Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Judicial
Activities, Opinion No. 40 (1975), 43 U.S.L.W. 2340 (Feb. 11, 1975) (federal judges should
resign membership in such organizations as Anti-Defamation League, Sierra Club, and
Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People, if such organizations are likely to come
before them or federal courts in general). This latter reasoning would be doubly true for
Judge Foster, who was actively involved in a business association with a company who
would frequently come before the courts in Baltimore City.
104. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 254 (1943) (emphasis
added).
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county zoning board was improper for the same reason.
The censure of Judge Foster in this situation indicates the
strictness with which the Commission and the Court of Appeals
will apply the Canons and Rules of Judicial Ethics. It is by far
the sternest case in any jurisdiction warning judges not to be
directly involved in business relationships. No other case was
found which disciplined a judge on this basis alone.
It is very difficult to mark the boundary between conduct
meriting removal and conduct meriting censure. The line lies
more in the degree of the misconduct, rather than its nature,
although there is a greater tendency to remove a judge for criminal actions or conduct directly affecting the performance of judicial duties. Diener and Broccolino fits into the latter category.
The Foster fact pattern involved neither, and the Court of Appeals ordered censure.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In the past eight years judicial discipline in Maryland has
become reality. The Commission on Judicial Disabilities is an
improvement over previous attempts at judicial discipline, as
illustrated by the two principal cases. However, further improvement is necessary. The recently approved constitutional amend0 5 by including
ment,"
an opportunity for the Court of Appeals to
keep portions of the record in a case before it secret, eliminated
the absolute right of the public to know the full circumstances of
each case. However, once the Commission recommends censure
or removal there is no justifiable purpose in keeping the proceedings secret.10 Therefore, the record should be once again opened
up completely to the public, upon its transmission to the Court
of Appeals.
Another procedural problem is posed by the lack of explicit
judicial review of a Commission reprimand, in the absence of a
Commission recommendation to the Court of Appeals. 0 Fairness
dictates some judicial review of the reprimand. A court rule requiring appellate review, upon request, of any decision of the
Commission would eliminate this potential trouble spot.
In the Foster case the Court of Appeals quoted favorably
from the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct.' 8 The court should now
105.
106.
107.
108.

See Ch. 886, § 1 [1974] Md. Laws 2961-62.
See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 31-36 and accompanying text supra.
271 Md. at 473-74, 318 A.2d at 535-36.
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adopt the Code in its entirety. 0 9 The mandatory nature of practically the entire Code, its acceptance in many courts, 10 and its
improvement in wording over the Canon's recommend it highly.",
As the number of judicial discipline commissions increases,
and this body of law continues to develop, hopefully all judges
will realize that their office carries with it the burden of keeping
as free of human frailties as possible, both on and off the bench.
The judicial system exists for the people, and we must set the
highest possible standards of conduct and demand their strict
enforcement. As Judge Smith of the Maryland Court of Appeals
has written: "Courts, be they high or low, should and must be like
Caesar's wife, above suspicion. Any other standard is one which
undermines the trust and confidence of the average citizen in his
government."" 2
109. Since it is a unified whole, the Code would eliminate the split in Rule 1231
between the current Maryland Canons and the Rules of Judicial Ethics. Desired features
of Rule 1231 (such as the mechanics of financial disclosure) could be incorporated into
the Code.
The Court of Appeals has already incorporated some Code language into the current
norms: in Maryland Canon VIII (from ABA Canon 3B(2), concerning staff conduct); XI
(from Canon 3B(3), concerning other court officer's conduct and the duty to report same);
XIII (from Canon 2B, banning judicial testimony as a character witness); XVI (from
Canon 3A(4), concerning outside consultation on a case); XXV (from Canon 3C(2), concerning awareness of personal finances); XXX (from Canon 3F, prohibiting a judge from
acting as an arbitrator). Compare also Ethics Rule 2 with ABA Canon 3C(1)(c) and Ethics
Rule 12 with ABA Canon 3A(6).
110. The Code of Judicial Conduct has been adopted in whole or in part in at least
35 states.
111. Traynor, The Code is Clear, 1972 UTAH L. REv. 333, 335.
112. Diener and Broccolino, 268 Md. at 698, 304 A.2d at 607.

